WITHIN a couple of weeks two well-known commentators, both familiar with Pakistan for many a year, one American and one British, have come out with papers suggesting reasons why Pakistan may finally prove to be a failing state — or collapse.
Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution we all know well. In February, he prepared a policy brief for NOREF entitled Coping with a failing Pakistan . He propounded on the various and varied reasons why `failing` is an option. “States are glorified bureaucracies,” he writes, “nations are ideas that are more or less viable.”
To its credit, Pakistan, against all odds, has survived for over 64 years, albeit not in its original form (political machinations took care of that). It has hung on grimly by the skin of its wobbly teeth and since the decade of the 1970s there have been murmurings and mumblings about it being a `failed state` without failure ever materialising. A banana republic, yes, one can easily put it in that category as it has forever been in hock to the highest bidder.
To state the obvious, it is the mighty army — united, disciplined, rich beyond belief, an industrial giant in its own right (porridge being one of its products) — which has never failed to ensure its own survival and thus that of the country that keeps it on top of the national heap, living on in the manner to which it has become accustomed.
As for the economy, according to Cohen, Pakistan has “fantasised over its economic prospects”, blaming others for its shortcomings and it has been unable or unwilling — expediency dictating — to do what it should do which is to tax the fat milch cows that sit in parliament and in the many different power houses that run the country.
The civilians and the military have both refused to deal honestly with a continuously failing economy which has rendered the country ungovernable by either and unlivable for a large majority of its burgeoning population.
Demographically there is danger. As with the economy, where the feudal, landowning, industrial lot has protected themselves, population control has been held hostage by the religious right and population growth has been unchecked due to the policy of pandering to the mullah masters.
Since the 1960s, no government has acknowledged the problem of the galloping population growth with which the country cannot cope. This criminal negligence — and the same goes for education — has contributed towards the inability to govern and fix the economy.
Cohen talks of political instability, the use of the free media by the militant-minded to undermine governance, deteriorating international relations, separatism and sectarianism, and an inability to rebuild state institutions. His summation is that a failing Pakistan which is how we apparently are regarded is damaging to any prospect of restoring South Asia`s strategic unity. The interested world will therefore have to put its collective heads together and think in terms of policy changes.
Anatol Lieven, who has been commenting on Pakistan for decades, has written a lengthy piece for the March/April issue of The National Interest , a bi-monthly US-based journal. His opening focus is on the impossibility of complete cooperation between Islamabad and Washington in the Afghan campaign. Pakistan will not and cannot deliver to the US what the US wants. That is one firm thought. He also premises that the US interest in Afghanistan is but fleeting whereas the preservation of Pakistan as a viable state is its vital concern.
The title, `A Mutiny Grows in Punjab` reveals all. It is Punjab and the military, which largely hails from that province, that are at the moment gluing Pakistan together. It is in Punjab that Pakistan will collapse or ultimately pull itself into shape.
With 56 per cent of the population, it naturally dominates the bureaucratic and military establishment. It has the most productive industry and agriculture — no arguing with that. But what it also has is militancy of the religious type, with banned outfits such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba nurtured and supported by the provincial government and those shadowy things known as the `agencies`.
On this subject, Lieven quotes my old friend Chandi — now better known as Syeda Abida Hussain, a high-flying member of the PPP (changing horses presents no problems to her). She has most aptly and wittily dubbed Punjab the `Prussian Bible Belt` — well done and bravo.
In this `belt` live and increasingly thrive the militant groups of the religious right; they are far more organised and efficient than their counterparts up in the frontier areas. And they have ties and links of various and varied natures with the mighty army that is the child of Punjab.
Therein lies the threat, the grave threat. And therein lies the possibility of a mutiny should unexpectedly the unlikely happen — in this country it has so often been (and is at the moment) the unlikely that prevails. Should there be some spark that splits the army ranks, that brings about a mutiny, Pakistan is sunk. Any fissure in the mighty army would surely bring about the collapse of the state — finally and ultimately. It is here that the deadliest danger is posed to the US and its allies.
What preventative measures can be taken? Well, says Lieven, “Above all, however, the removal of the hated American presence, and the end of US attacks inside Pakistan, would greatly diminish impulses to radicalise in that country, especially if the United States can help develop that state economically (admittedly a horribly difficult process, especially under the present Pakistani government).”
Amazing it is, how others, sitting on the outside, manage to see us as we fail to see ourselves — as we persist in our state of denial.
Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution we all know well. In February, he prepared a policy brief for NOREF entitled Coping with a failing Pakistan . He propounded on the various and varied reasons why `failing` is an option. “States are glorified bureaucracies,” he writes, “nations are ideas that are more or less viable.”
To its credit, Pakistan, against all odds, has survived for over 64 years, albeit not in its original form (political machinations took care of that). It has hung on grimly by the skin of its wobbly teeth and since the decade of the 1970s there have been murmurings and mumblings about it being a `failed state` without failure ever materialising. A banana republic, yes, one can easily put it in that category as it has forever been in hock to the highest bidder.
To state the obvious, it is the mighty army — united, disciplined, rich beyond belief, an industrial giant in its own right (porridge being one of its products) — which has never failed to ensure its own survival and thus that of the country that keeps it on top of the national heap, living on in the manner to which it has become accustomed.
As for the economy, according to Cohen, Pakistan has “fantasised over its economic prospects”, blaming others for its shortcomings and it has been unable or unwilling — expediency dictating — to do what it should do which is to tax the fat milch cows that sit in parliament and in the many different power houses that run the country.
The civilians and the military have both refused to deal honestly with a continuously failing economy which has rendered the country ungovernable by either and unlivable for a large majority of its burgeoning population.
Demographically there is danger. As with the economy, where the feudal, landowning, industrial lot has protected themselves, population control has been held hostage by the religious right and population growth has been unchecked due to the policy of pandering to the mullah masters.
Since the 1960s, no government has acknowledged the problem of the galloping population growth with which the country cannot cope. This criminal negligence — and the same goes for education — has contributed towards the inability to govern and fix the economy.
Cohen talks of political instability, the use of the free media by the militant-minded to undermine governance, deteriorating international relations, separatism and sectarianism, and an inability to rebuild state institutions. His summation is that a failing Pakistan which is how we apparently are regarded is damaging to any prospect of restoring South Asia`s strategic unity. The interested world will therefore have to put its collective heads together and think in terms of policy changes.
Anatol Lieven, who has been commenting on Pakistan for decades, has written a lengthy piece for the March/April issue of The National Interest , a bi-monthly US-based journal. His opening focus is on the impossibility of complete cooperation between Islamabad and Washington in the Afghan campaign. Pakistan will not and cannot deliver to the US what the US wants. That is one firm thought. He also premises that the US interest in Afghanistan is but fleeting whereas the preservation of Pakistan as a viable state is its vital concern.
The title, `A Mutiny Grows in Punjab` reveals all. It is Punjab and the military, which largely hails from that province, that are at the moment gluing Pakistan together. It is in Punjab that Pakistan will collapse or ultimately pull itself into shape.
With 56 per cent of the population, it naturally dominates the bureaucratic and military establishment. It has the most productive industry and agriculture — no arguing with that. But what it also has is militancy of the religious type, with banned outfits such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba nurtured and supported by the provincial government and those shadowy things known as the `agencies`.
On this subject, Lieven quotes my old friend Chandi — now better known as Syeda Abida Hussain, a high-flying member of the PPP (changing horses presents no problems to her). She has most aptly and wittily dubbed Punjab the `Prussian Bible Belt` — well done and bravo.
In this `belt` live and increasingly thrive the militant groups of the religious right; they are far more organised and efficient than their counterparts up in the frontier areas. And they have ties and links of various and varied natures with the mighty army that is the child of Punjab.
Therein lies the threat, the grave threat. And therein lies the possibility of a mutiny should unexpectedly the unlikely happen — in this country it has so often been (and is at the moment) the unlikely that prevails. Should there be some spark that splits the army ranks, that brings about a mutiny, Pakistan is sunk. Any fissure in the mighty army would surely bring about the collapse of the state — finally and ultimately. It is here that the deadliest danger is posed to the US and its allies.
What preventative measures can be taken? Well, says Lieven, “Above all, however, the removal of the hated American presence, and the end of US attacks inside Pakistan, would greatly diminish impulses to radicalise in that country, especially if the United States can help develop that state economically (admittedly a horribly difficult process, especially under the present Pakistani government).”
Amazing it is, how others, sitting on the outside, manage to see us as we fail to see ourselves — as we persist in our state of denial.